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Abstract
This Special Issue of the Journal of Strategic Security (JSS) presents the
results of a series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to engage in
complex engineering tasks, in the hope of informing strategic
assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies.
One particular concern in international security lies at the nexus of
violent non-state actors (VNSAs) and sophisticated technologies. When it
comes to the assessment of such threats, much of the analysis hinges
upon being able to accurately judge the desire and capability of
adversaries to successfully carry out complex engineering operations.
Yet, the actual process of how and why VNSAs engage in these efforts
and the determinants of their success or failure are understudied
aspects, at least in terms of systematic comparison across actors,
technologies and time periods. This special issue presents the results of a
series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to engage in complex
engineering tasks, in the hope of informing strategic assessments of the
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threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies. The introductory
article defines a complex engineering effort, summarizes the existing
literature on the topic and sets out the methodology and framing
questions used in the case studies.
Disclaimer
Editor’s Note: This article forms part of a series of related case studies
collected in this Special Issue and should be viewed in the context of the
broader phenomenon of complex engineering by violent non-state actors.
Readers are advised to consult the introductory and concluding papers
for a full explanation and comparative analysis of the cases.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by Sandia National Laboratories, Contract
#1525332. Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in
this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of
Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/3
 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Among the many global dynamics rising to the fore in the 21st century, two of 
the most prominent are the growth in the systemic influence of terrorists and 
other violent non-state actors (VNSAs), and the advent of a range of 
transformational technologies.  In the context of international security, there 
is particular concern with respect to the nexus of these two forces, where it is 
feared that VNSAs might adopt emerging technologies, such as synthetic 
biology or quantum computing, to magnify the threat that they pose.  
 
On the one hand, it is tempting to inflate the threat, painting VNSAs as 
Bondian-supervillians capable of casually constructing doomsday weapons, 
while ignoring the multiple hurdles inherent in such enterprises and the 
empirical fact that in the past most VNSAs most of the time have shown 
themselves to be conservative and imitative rather than innovative in their 
tactics and weapons.1  On the other hand, it may be even more hazardous to 
assume that VNSAs will never be able to successfully adopt new technologies, 
when there exist several historical examples of VNSAs doing just that.  
 
While a large part of the security concern lies in the fact that many emerging 
technologies render it easier, safer and less costly for non-experts to adopt 
new weapons and tactics,2 for several prominent threats—especially those 
stemming from the potential VNSA use of so-called “weapons of mass 
destruction”—the process of adoption and deployment as a whole still 
requires a complex application of knowledge and materials in a practical 
context.  Thus, when it comes to the assessment of such threats, much of the 
analysis hinges upon being able to accurately judge the desire and capability 
of adversaries to successfully carry out complex engineering operations.  
 
Yet, the actual process of how and why VNSAs engage in these efforts and the 
determinants of their success or failure are understudied aspects, at least in 
terms of systematic comparison across actors, technologies and time periods. 
A team of researchers at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
                                                 
1 Jenkins, Brian, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101, 
Reflections on Providing for “The Common Good,” 101:5 (1986), 777-778; Hoffman, 
Bruce, Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities (Santa Monica, 
California: RAND, 1992), 15; Dolnik, Adam, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: 
Technology, tactics and global trends (New York: Routledge, 2007), 56. 
2 Ackerman, Gary, “‘More Bang for the Buck’: Examining the Determinants of Terrorist 
Adoption of New Weapons Technologies” (PhD Dissertation: King’s College London, 
2014), 23, available at: 
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/32901277/2014_Ackerman_Gary_0715371_ethes
is.pdf. 
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and Responses to Terrorism (START) therefore came together with the 
objective of deriving insights regarding the dynamics and outcomes of 
complex engineering efforts undertaken by VNSAs.  This special issue 
presents the results of a series of case studies of prior efforts by VNSAs to 
engage in complex engineering tasks, in the hope of informing strategic 
assessments of the threat of VNSA exploitation of emerging technologies. 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define a complex engineering effort, as 
undertaken by a VNSA.  Thus, for the purposes of this volume, a complex 
engineering effort by a VNSA is one that involves: 
 
 Multiple components (sub-tasks) of different types (e.g., mechanical, 
chemical, machining) that must integrate properly in order for the 
effort to succeed; 
 
 The manpower of more than just one person;3 
 
 A variety of technical skills (such as chemical synthesis, welding, or 
electronics); and 
 
 A more sophisticated effort than standard operations for the context 
(time and place) in which the VNSA is operating.  
 
Framing the Study4 
There has been almost no discussion in the terrorism,5 insurgency or 
organized crime literatures that is specifically directed towards complex 
                                                 
3 Complexity usually implies an interaction of multiple parts and, since we are focused 
here on VNSA organizations rather than lone actors, we restrict the definition of a 
complex engineering effort to one involving multiple people. It is partly the very 
requirement for different individuals within an organization to cooperate and integrate 
their activities in order to achieve a common goal that makes a particular task “complex” 
in this sense. Therefore, no matter how ingenious and versatile a particular single 
member is, their individual efforts, at least in the current instance, can be complicated, 
but not complex. 
4 The author would like to acknowledge the efforts of Daniel Smith, James Halverson, 
Molly MacCalman and Michelle Jacome in assisting him in assembling a broad literature 
review from which this section is drawn. 
5 Without wanting to enter the definitional fray surrounding terrorism, in this issue the 
term is used in the sense of “The intentional use or threatened use of violence by an 
ideologically motivated non-state actor in a manner that would be regarded in wartime as 
contravening international humanitarian law and that is directed against victims selected 
for their symbolic or representative value, as a means of instilling anxiety in, transmitting 
one or more messages to, and thereby manipulating the attitudes and behavior of a wider 
target audience or audiences”—based on the definition espoused by Jeffrey Bale. See Gary 
Ackerman, et. al., Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure, 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1
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engineering efforts by VNSAs, as here defined.  However, there is a fair 
amount of material on both related superordinate and subordinate topics.  In 
a broader sense, a complex engineering effort in the VNSA context will almost 
always represent a qualitative departure from the status quo operating 
posture for a particular VNSA, since it is rare (except perhaps in the case of 
sophisticated IEDs for some rebel groups in places like Iraq) for a VNSA to 
have “industrialized” its logistical or weapons acquisition systems to the 
extent that complex efforts become merely incremental changes to a long-
standing standard operating procedure.  Therefore, complex engineering 
efforts can usually be situated within the wider topic of VNSA innovation, 
about which there is a growing literature.6  Nonetheless, only a subset of 
VNSA innovations will qualify as complex engineering efforts.  Therefore, the 
extent to which more general findings about VNSA learning and innovation 
apply to the specific situation of complex engineering efforts, or whether 
additional dynamics might characterize these efforts, is still an open question.  
 
Similarly, one subset of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs—the potential 
for them to produce their own high-level chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) weapons—has been extensively discussed,7 especially in the 
case of improvised nuclear devices.8  Yet, this literature has largely focused on 
                                                 
Report for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the Department of Homeland 
Security (Monterey, California: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004), 
available at https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/341566.pdf, 10 January 2010, p. 15 (ftn 51). 
6 Ranstorp, Magnus and Magnus Normark (eds.), Understanding Terrorism Innovation 
and Learning: Al-Qaeda and Beyond, (New York: Routledge, 2015); Dolnik, 
Understanding Terrorist Innovation; Rasmussen, Maria J. and Mohamed Hafez (eds.) 
Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive 
Indicators (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 
Report Number ASCO 2010-019, 2010), 18, available at: 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=9908; Jackson, Brian A. et al., Aptitude for 
Destruction-Vol. 1. Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications 
for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007); Gill, Paul, John Horgan, Samuel 
T. Hunter and Lily D. Cushenbery, “Malevolent creativity in terrorist organizations”, 
Journal of Creative Behavior 47:2 (2013), 125-151; and Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to 
Osama (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2008). 
7 See, for example: Waller, Jr., Forest E. and Michael A. George, “Emerging WMD 
Technologies,” in Russell D. Howard and James J.F. Forest (eds.), Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Terrorism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 499-511; Bunn, Matthew, 
“Guardians at the Gates of Hell” (PhD dissertation: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2007); Koblentz, Gregory D., Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and 
International Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); and Smithson, Amy E., 
“Indicators of Chemical Terrorism” in Ranstorp and Normark (eds.), Unconventional 
Weapons and International Terrorism, 67-94. 
8 Ferguson, Charles D. and William Potter, et. al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism 
(New York: Routledge, 2005); Levi, Michael, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007); and Jenkins, Brian Michael, Will Terrorists Go 
Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008). 
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the narrow technical requirements of the specific weapon type under 
consideration, with little reference to whether these requirements extend to 
the topic of complex engineering efforts outside the CBRN realm or to novel, 
emerging technologies.  The decision making and requirements surrounding 
the construction of as unique a weapon as an improvised nuclear device might 
very well be sui generis and less applicable to other complex engineering 
efforts. 
 
Therefore, while existing scholarship can provide a guide for understanding 
complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, there is still a gap in the 
understanding of exactly which of the many factors and dynamics identified 
in the literature on VNSA innovation and WMD development apply in the 
case of complex engineering efforts, how strongly they act on the process, and 
whether there are certain factors that become especially salient in the context 
of complex engineering efforts.  
 
In order to inform our exploration of the topic, we drew on the existing 
literature described above as a source of insights that might be relevant to 
investigating VNSA complex engineering efforts, focusing on those that seem 
most appropriate to the current topic.  It should be noted that this is a 
preliminary investigation and we are not at this stage laying out or formally 
testing hypotheses.  Rather, we seek to identify potentially salient factors and 
dynamics that can be formally validated by further research.  Among the key 
theories and findings from the broader literature that guided our examination 
of VNSA complex engineering efforts were the following: 
 
1. The process of decision making surrounding VNSA technology 
adoption is equifinite.  In other words, there is no single (and not 
necessarily even a predominant) causal path to deciding to adopt, say, 
a new weapon.9 
 
2. Major identified drivers of VNSA innovation in general and the pursuit 
of WMD in particular include: countermeasures imposed by 
opponents;10 desensitization of the target public or the intended 
constituency;11 a desire for greater status either within the VNSA, 
                                                 
9 Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck’, 219. 
10 Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation, 153; Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 252, Jackson, et al., Aptitude for 
Destruction, 19. 
11 Schmid, Alex P. and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism 
and the Western News Media (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), 172. 
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relative to other VNSAs, or as an actor on the world stage;12 and an 
ideological or psychological need on the part of leaders to engage in 
technologically sophisticated operations (sometimes referred to as 
“techno-fetishism”).13 
 
3. The decision to innovate and/or the process itself can be facilitated by: 
champions either within or outside the VNSA,14 demonstration of the 
technology by15 and collaboration16 with other VNSAs (especially those 
within the same social network); a willingness to learn and 
experiment;17 and an overall organizational tolerance for taking risks.18 
 
4. Having a separate, institutionalized “engineering” or R&D organ 
within the organization19 and a safe haven20 are important factors in 
both a positive decision to innovate and the ultimate success of 
innovation adoption attempts. Conversely, intra-organizational 
discord21 and pressures from security forces can impede adoption 
efforts.22 
 
5. Some technology development efforts can take on their own 
momentum within an organization, as vested interests for the effort 
develop.23 
 
                                                 
12 Ferguson, Charles D. and William C. Potter, Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear 
Terrorism (Stockholm, Sweden: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006), 6. 
13 Jeffrey M. Bale and Gary A. Ackerman, “Profiling the WMD Terrorist Threat” in 
Stephen M. Maurer (ed.), WMD Terrorism: Science and Policy Choices (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2009); Ronfeldt, David and William Sater. The Mindsets of High-Technology 
Terrorists: Future Implications from an Historical Analog (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1981), 15, 27; Jackson, Brian A., “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat 
Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 24:3 (2001), 193; Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations 
in Weapons of Mass Effect, 18. 
14 Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck,” 52, 93. 
15 Ibid., 106. 
16 Hargadon, Andrew. 2003. How Breakthroughs Happen: The Surprising Truth about 
How Companies Innovate (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2003), ix, 60. 
17 Jackson, Aptitude for Destruction, 46; Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in 
Weapons of Mass Effect, 3. 
18 Jackson et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 46; Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist 
Innovation, 167. 
19 Jackson et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 46; Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck’, 240. 
20 Jackson, et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 43.  
21 Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck’, 150. 
22 Jackson, et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 57. 
23 MacKenzie, Donald, Essays on Technical Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 58. 
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6. With respect to obtaining the requisite expertise for innovation, the 
literature suggests that VNSAs do not necessarily require members 
with outstanding technical expertise, but instead a membership that is 
stable, proficient in analyzing existing methods and resources, and can 
reconfigure these to meet an organization’s goals.24 
  
7. While VNSAs may vary considerably with respect to the value they 
place on the safety and security of members involved in innovation 
efforts, key members with technical skills and experience will generally 
be protected, as their loss can severely diminish a group’s 
capabilities.25 
  
One feature of existing scholarship is copious discussion of the different 
pathways by which VNSAs could acquire a WMD capability, such as by theft, 
transfer from a patron, or purchase on a putative black market.  However, in 
the current context of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, by definition we 
presume that the bulk of the adoption process consists of internal 
development activities carried out by group members, with perhaps only raw 
materials or equipment being procured through other means.  Furthermore, 
the existing literature says relatively little about the process by which a 
complex engineering task is implemented, other than to prescribe acquiring 
the necessary knowledge and skills, ensuring adequate funding, equipment 
and materials, and establishing a development site.  There was therefore 
particular emphasis placed in the current study on the implementation 
aspects of complex engineering efforts.  
 
The collective insights extracted from related literatures thus led the research 
team to adopt the following framing questions to shape its exploration of 
complex engineering efforts by VNSAs: 
 
 What drives VNSAs to undertake complex engineering tasks?  
 
 Who makes decisions and what is the role of risk perceptions?  
 
 How is the relevant expertise required? 
 
 How are the security and safety of the effort ensured?  
 
                                                 
24 Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, 2; Jackson, 
et. al., Aptitude for Destruction, 48. 
25 Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups”, 194. 
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 How are obstacles dealt with? 
 
 Why do these attempts either succeed or fail? 
 
Methodology 
Given that there is little to no prior research on complex engineering efforts 
by VNSAs, it is appropriate to examine the topic in an exploratory fashion.26 
This approach places less emphasis on controlling for certain variables or 
comparing both positive and negative cases, as would be necessary if the 
objective was to test an existing theory.  Therefore, in order to gain from our 
preliminary analysis as much direction as possible regarding where to steer 
future research, we focused on those cases where complex engineering tasks 
had at least been attempted, leaving more complicated comparative analyses27 
to later studies.  Similarly, we sought to gain as much variety in temporal, 
geographic and cultural context between cases as possible, in order to more 
easily and accurately identify organizational factors fundamentally associated 
with the decision to engage in complex engineering tasks and the successful 
completion of such tasks.  
 
To select cases, we therefore sought instances that met the following criteria: 
a) the activity undertaken by the VNSA must qualify as a complex engineering 
effort, as defined above; b) cases that showed variety in terms of the context 
in which they occurred and the activity engaged in; and c) for practical 
purposes, cases for which sufficient data existed in the open sources to allow 
for a detailed description of the dynamics involved.  An initial survey of 
available literature and databases yielded 22 candidate cases, as listed 
chronologically in Table 1.1. 
  
                                                 
26 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 20-22, 45 
27 These include controlled comparison, congruence procedures and process tracing – see 
Van Evera, Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 56-67. 
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Table 1.1 Complex Engineering by VNSAs – Candidate Cases 
 
Candidate Case 
(VNSA – 
Engineering Effort) 
Extent 
to 
which 
CEE 
Outcome28 
Adversary 
Type 
Time 
Period 
Region 
Data 
Availability 
ETA (Basque separatists) 
– Remote-controlled Car 
4 Apocryphal Terrorist N/A Europe N/A 
Anarchists –  
Dynamite Weapons 
2 Success Terrorist 
1880s-
1900s 
Europe  Yes 
Ahmed Jibril (Popular 
Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine) – 
Barometric  Pressure 
Bombs 
3 Success Terrorist 
1960s-
1970s 
Middle 
East; 
Europe 
Yes 
Provisional IRA –  
Mortar system 
4 Success Terrorist 
1970s-
1990s 
Europe Yes 
Rajneeshees –  
Biological Weapons 
2 Success 
Terrorist / 
Cult 
1980s 
N. 
America 
Yes 
LTTE (Tamil Tigers) – 
Fast Attack boats 
3 Success Terrorist 
1980s-
2000s 
Asia Yes 
Aum Shinrikyo – 
Biological Weapons 
5 Failure 
Terrorist / 
Cult 
1990s Asia  Yes 
Aum Shinrikyo –  
Nuclear Weapons 
5 Failure 
Terrorist / 
Cult 
1990s Asia  Yes 
Aum Shinrikyo – 
Chemical Weapons 
4 Success 
Terrorist / 
Cult 
1990s Asia  Yes 
Ramzi Yousef – 
Sophisticated Liquid 
Explosive Devices 
3 Success Terrorist 1990s 
N. 
America; 
Asia 
Partial 
Al-Qaida –  
Chem / Bio Weapons 
2 Failure Terrorist 
1990s-
2000s 
Middle 
East; Asia 
Yes 
Al-Qaida –  
Nuclear Weapons 
5 Failure Terrorist 
1990s-
2000s 
Middle 
East; Asia 
Partial 
FARC – Submersibles 5 Success 
Terrorist / 
TCO29 
1990s-
Present 
South 
America 
Yes 
Hamas – Tunnels 4 Success Terrorist 2000s 
Middle 
East 
Yes 
Hezbollah –  
Guidance System  
4 Success Terrorist 2000s 
Middle 
East 
No 
Hezbollah – Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles 
4 Success Terrorist 2000s 
Middle 
East 
No 
AL-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula –  
Printer Cartridge Bomb 
3 Success Terrorist 2000s 
Middle 
East 
Yes 
AL-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula  –  
Underwear Bomb 
3 Success Terrorist 2000s 
Middle 
East 
Yes 
Hamas – Cyanide 2 Failure Terrorist 2000s 
Middle 
East 
No  
                                                 
28 Success denotes cases where the engineering effort yielded functional and at least 
partially efficacious results, failure denotes cases that did not, and apocryphal refers to 
cases that are mentioned in the open sources but there is no credible evidence that they 
ever actually occurred. 
29 TCO = Transnational Criminal Organization. 
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Zetas – Radio Network 4 Success TCO 
2000s-
Present 
N. 
America 
Yes 
Hamas – UAVs 4 Success Terrorist 2010s 
Middle 
East 
No 
Syrian Rebels –  
“Drive by wire” Machine 
Gun Vehicle 
3 Undetermined Insurgent 2010s 
Middle 
East 
No 
 
 
Upon further research, one case (ETA’s production of a remote-controlled 
vehicle) was quickly excluded because it was likely apocryphal and based on a 
mistranslation of news reports.  Any candidate for which there was not a high 
degree of confidence of sufficiently detailed information being available in the 
open sources was also dropped from consideration.  The remaining cases 
were prioritized in terms of the degree to which they met the definition of a 
complex engineering effort provided above, judged subjectively on a 1 to 5 
scale.  This was measured against the complexity of the task that was 
attempted, irrespective of the extent to which the actor succeeded.  Thus, 
Aum Shinrikyo’s attempts to produce a nuclear weapon, even though these 
never progressed beyond the embryonic stage, receive the highest rating given 
the inherent complexity of actually constructing an improvised nuclear 
device.   
 
Also, for tasks where the complexity varies across subcategories of weapon or 
technology pursued, the rating is based on the specific type actually pursued 
by the VNSA.  So, for example, since al-Qaida and Hamas only pursued 
relatively primitive chemical agents (such as cyanide), their efforts receive a 
lower rating than the chemical weapons exploits of Aum Shinrikyo, which 
pursued more sophisticated agents like sarin and VX.  Similarly, while 
submersibles can range across multiple levels of complexity, those pursued by 
FARC, which included integrated and advanced propulsion, navigation and 
life support systems, receive a higher rating.30  In order to explore the most 
clear-cut instances of complex engineering efforts, it was decided to only 
consider cases scoring 4 or 5.  This left the cases in the highlighted rows in 
Table 1.1.31 
                                                 
30 Since the scale only goes up to 5, both the efforts of FARC and Aum’s nuclear efforts 
receive the maximum value, even though nuclear weapons are arguably somewhat more 
complex to construct than submersibles. 
31 While Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons program also met the criteria, this program 
has been extensively detailed elsewhere (for example, see Richard, Danzig, Marc 
Sageman, et. al., Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and 
Chemical Weapons (2nd Edition) (Center for a New American Security, 2012), available 
at: 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_SecondEdit
ion_English.pdf, making a detailed case study less useful.  Therefore, researchers 
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The cases selected for this study were therefore: 
 
1. The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the development of 
advanced mortar systems. 
 
2. Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs (combined 
into a single case). 
 
3. The production of submersibles and submarines by FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). 
 
4. The Los Zetas transnational criminal organizations’ construction and 
maintenance of an expansive radio communication network across 
Mexico. 
 
5. Hamas and the construction of attack tunnel networks from Gaza into 
Israel. 
 
These five cases span six different types of engineering activity, three types of 
organization (terrorist, criminal and hybrid), four regions, and each decade 
from the 1970s to the present, thus providing ample variety in terms of 
context.  While researching possible cases, researchers also noted the 
importance of the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology smuggling network.  
Although not itself qualifying as a complex engineering effort, the evolution 
and activities of this network provide a stark illustration of one avenue by 
which violent non-state actors might gain access to the sophisticated 
technology and expertise required for a particular complex engineering effort. 
It was therefore decided to conduct a sixth case study on the A.Q. Khan saga, 
which, although differing from the other five, demonstrates how illicit 
networks might facilitate a violent non-state actor’s complex engineering 
efforts. 
 
The research team then assigned one or more authors to each case, based on 
prior expertise and interest.  This was followed by the data collection phase, 
which comprised extensive research of the open sources, including books, 
journal articles, government reports and news reports.  This was 
supplemented in several cases by interviews with experts having intimate 
                                                 
regarded it as sufficient to focus on the cult’s chemical and nuclear programs, the former 
effort regarded as at least a qualified engineering success and the latter an abject failure. 
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knowledge of the particular case or VNSA.  Collected sources were then 
evaluated for relevance, reliability, and corroboration or contradiction.  With 
respect to the actual construction of the case studies, all authors were 
instructed to attempt to answer the framing questions listed above and to 
structure their analysis according to a standardized format.  This consisted of 
four main sections, each of which was designed to broach a number of sub-
topics as far as available information allowed.  Each case was therefore 
structured as follows:32 
 
1. An introductory section providing background and a summary of the 
type of complex engineering effort undertaken by the VNSA. 
 
2. A section on the decision to engage in the complex engineering effort, 
encompassing, where possible, the motivation behind the effort, the 
decision makers involved, the degree of risk tolerated by the VNSA and 
the length of the planning and development cycle. 
 
3. A section on the implementation aspects of the effort, including not 
only a discussion of the process followed, but also descriptions of the 
implementing parties, sources of technical expertise, any collaboration 
with external parties, safety and security considerations, and obstacles 
that were encountered throughout the process. 
 
4. A concluding section, providing an analysis both of why the VNSA was 
drawn to pursuing the particular complex engineering task and the 
factors that were ultimately responsible for the success (or otherwise) 
of its efforts. 
 
The six case studies, together with their individual findings, are presented in 
the remainder this special issue.  The first five cases follow the structured 
format shown above, while the A.Q. Khan case highlights the establishment 
and ultimate break-up of the nuclear smuggling network. Upon completion of 
the case studies, it became possible to synthesize and compare the complex 
engineering efforts undertaken by the VNSAs, a task carried out in the 
concluding article of this issue. 
 
 
                                                 
32 The A.Q. Khan case, being qualitatively different from the rest, followed a somewhat 
different structure, focusing on the evolution of the network and why it persisted for so 
long, as well as why it was ultimately interdicted. 
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